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Articles

Introduction: Conversations About the
State of the Legal Profession
Peter G. Glenn*
With this symposium the Dickinson Law Review celebrates a
century of service to the law and to the legal profession. Born near
the close of the nineteenth century, the Review examines here some
of the issues facing a profession said to be in "crisis" near the close
of the twentieth century. It is fitting that the Review should
celebrate its Centennial by publishing essays about challenges to
the profession; the work of the Review always has been grounded
in the law, as practiced, developed, and taught, exploring doctrine
and theory in relation to, and with respect for, the work of judges,
lawyers, and law professors.
This symposium issue of the Review addresses some of our
current professional challenges from a variety of perspectives, with
a variety of voices, and with a variety of levels of optimism. The
editors of the Review suggested to the symposium contributors that
they write essays stimulated by two recent books, Yale Law School
Dean Anthony T. Kronman's The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of
the Legal Profession,' and Harvard Law Professor Mary Ann
Glendon's A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal

* Dean and Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law.
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Profession is Transforming American Society.2 Our profession regularly and almost habitually - describes itself as being in a state
of "crisis.", 3 Dean Kronman's The Lost Lawyer is avowedly "about
a crisis in the American legal profession." 4 Professor Glendon's
subtitle declares the existence of a "crisis." A profession linked to
societal and institutional change inevitably will be challenged by
change itself, especially when the society it serves feels the effects
of industrialization, depression, war, population growth, and rapid
advances in technology and medicine, and when that society
regularly debates whether government should provide legal services
to society's less fortunate members. Even acknowledging the
inevitability of change sometimes erroneously seen as "crisis," it is
arguable, as has been suggested by Professors David Luban and
Michael Millemann, that the current climate of distress is not
merely another cyclical occurrence but instead might be "The Big
One,"5 the crisis that results in genuinely fundamental change.
It has become commonplace that our profession acknowledges
significant, negative changes in the practice of law, in lawyers'
satisfaction with their professional lives, in relationships between
clients and lawyers, in public respect for lawyers, and in professional self-confidence. On the other hand, our profession can justly
claim important successes: many of the civil rights and civil
liberties victories of this century were ultimately won by lawyers.
Although we have a substantial body of unmet legal needs, and
although the question of publicly funded legal services is a matter
of intense debate, we have made progress in the effort to provide
legal services to the poor. Our profession's thoughtful selfconsciousness about questions of professional ethics has increased
dramatically in the past two decades. During the past quarter
century the profession has become considerably more accessible to
women and members of ethnic and racial minorities. And, contrary
to many complaints and criticisms (some of which are well
deserved), the nation's law schools have expanded the nature and
improved the quality of legal education. There is much cause for

2. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994).

3. See Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crisesor One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism,
1925-1960, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 144, 145 (Robert L. Nelson et al.
eds., 1992).
4. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 1.
5. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching and Dark
Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 32 (1995).
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pride. But there is, nonetheless, a pervasive sense that economic,
intellectual, and social change has weakened the legal profession perhaps irreparably.
Whether the crisis now facing the profession is, to use Luban
and Millemann's phrase, "The Big One," will never, of course, be
known except in hindsight. It is possible to say now, however, that
although we might reasonably visualize the end of the "Big Firms"
as we now know them, and the disappearance of some of our law
schools and dramatic changes in others, and although we might
reasonably predict the loss of the profession's monopoly over some
legal services and the .end of professional self-regulation as we
know it, our complex society always will need the good judgment
and skilled assistance of law-trained men and women. Lawyers
protect individuals and groups from otherwise unchecked power,
they create and nurture effective public and private institutions, and
they provide, in the best sense of the word, a conservative
perspective to help society manage change. Society needs - and
will continue to need - good lawyers. But neither this justified
optimism nor recognition of our profession's successes excuses us
from the obligation to examine critically the nature of the challenges the profession faces and the changes the profession has both
experienced and wrought. Such a critical examination is a useful
function of Dean Kronman's and Professor Glendon's books.
Conversations about what lawyers, judges, and law professors do
and how they think are essential if we are to learn from our
present circumstances and move forward to serve society in the
next century. This symposium is an effort to stimulate such
conversations.
Dean Kronman and Professor Glendon provide parallel sets of
observations about the current state of the profession. Both
Kronman and Glendon believe that during the past three decades
the profession has lost touch with important ideals and values that
helped define and ennoble our calling. For Dean Kronman, the
lost professional "ideal" is the ideal of the "lawyer-statesman," a
person who "excels at the art of deliberation as others excel at
writing, singing, or chess. The lawyer-statesman is a paragon of
judgment, and others look to him for leadership on account of his
extraordinary deliberative power."6 The qualities that distinguish
the lawyer-statesman are traits of character - "settled dispositions"

6. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 15.
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and "temperamental qualities."7 The fundamental characteristic
of the lawyer-statesman is the capacity to exercise prudent or
"practical wisdom." This, says Kronman, was the ideal or "ennobling thought" that, at least through the mid-twentieth century,
stood as the model of professional excellence. Indeed he points to
the publication of Karl Llewellyn's The Common Law Tradition8
and Alexander Bickel's, The Least Dangerous Branch9 as offering
evidence of the appeal into the 1960s of the lawyer-statesman/prudential ideal."
According to Dean Kronman, however, the ideal has been
eroded and perhaps lost because of the effects of anti-prudential
bias in the dominant modes of modern academic legal thought, the
effects of growth and the commercialization of the practice of law
in large firms, and the changing nature of the work of the courts in which efficiency has replaced wisdom.'
Professor Glendon, like Dean Kronman, sees a basic change
in our shared understanding or idealization of what it means to be
a lawyer, judge, or law teacher, and in our common vision of the
rule of law. According to Professor Glendon, during the past thirty
years "a significant reordering has been taking place in what
lawyers believe, or profess to believe, about law and their own
roles in the legal system. A major struggle is under way among
competing ideas of what constitutes excellence in a judge, a
practitioner, a teacher or scholar of law."' 2 And Professor
Glendon leaves no doubt that she regrets the loss of faith in the
craftsmanship of the common law tradition as described by Karl
Llewellyn, a loss that is very similar to the loss of the ideal of
prudential or practical wisdom described by Dean Kronman.
Not surprisingly, the arguments of these two books are constructed somewhat similarly. Each book describes dramatic
changes in the nature of big firm law practice caused by commercial and economic changes, and each book describes an evolution
(or perhaps revolution) in the nature of legal scholarship and
(perhaps) law teaching with the effect that the education available
to would-be lawyers is either anti-prudential (Kronman) or

7. Id. at 342.
8. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960).
9. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).

10. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 50.
11. Id. at 4.
12. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 7-8.
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insufficiently related to the craft of lawyering and judging (Glendon). And each book expresses real disappointment with the quality
of the work of the courts.
Although none of our symposium contributors chose to focus
on the Kronman and Glendon critiques of the courts, Kronman's
and Glendon's differing critical analyses of the judiciary are among
the most interesting arguments in the two books. Professor
Glendon's thesis, in a nutshell, is that too many of our judges, both
liberal and conservative, have become what she describes as
"romantic judges" who have adopted an overly expansive view of
the judicial function. She quotes the late J. Skelly Wright on the
subject of his appellate opinions expanding landlords' liability for
the condition of leased premises: "I didn't like what I saw, and I
did what I could to ameliorate, if not eliminate, the injustice
involved in the way many of the poor were required to live in the
nation's capital. I offer no apology for not following more closely
the legal precedents which had cooperated in creating the conditions that I found unjust."' 3 Professor Glendon argues that
judicial attitude she describes as romantic judging is fundamentally
at odds with our conception of the rule of law and is therefore
dangerous.
Dean Kronman, whose ideal, the lawyer-statesman, is a
paragon of deliberation, not surprisingly looks to the courts as an
institution likely to be hospitable to that ideal. He is, however,
disappointed with what he finds - a depreciation of the lawyerstatesman deliberative ideal resulting from the pressure of heavy
caseloads. Courts, Kronman says, have valued efficiency more than
deliberation, have relied too much on staff, including inexperienced
law clerks, and have adopted a case-management rather than
deliberative state of mind. Dean Kronman sees these developto
ments as transforming the work of judging from "statesmanship
'4
instead.'
skill
administrative
only
requiring
[a function]
Both Dean Kronman and Professor Glendon decry some of
the changes in the law schools that have occurred during the past
several decades. Dean Kronman describes the history of changes
in the dominant modes of academic legal thought that have

13. GLENDON, supra note 2, at 161 (quoting Letter from J. Skelly Wright to Professor
Edward Rabin, in Edward Rabin, The Revolution in Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 549 (1984)).
14. KRONMAN, supra note 1, at 342.
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resulted in an anti-prudential bias expressed in legal scholarship
and, ultimately, in law school classrooms. The result is that law
students are not being exposed to opportunities for learning to
value or emulate the skills and dispositions of prudential judgment.
Dean Kronman's description of the changes he regrets is an
exceptionally lucid examination of a major portion of the history of
American legal thought from Langdell's attempts to justify
university legal education on the basis of a scientific theory of the
law, through the legal realist movement in this century, to the law
and economics and critical legal studies movements of the last
twenty years. Dean Kronman argues that both law and economics
- which he says is the dominant mode of intellectual thought in
American law schools today - and critical legal studies are
successors to the scientific approaches to law proposed by Langdell
and others. These scientific modes of thought are hostile to the
prudential strain of legal realism represented by the later works of
Karl Llewellyn. Prudentialism, according to Kronman, has been
expelled from our law schools by theorists who are disrespectful of
approaches to law that do not lend themselves to highly abstract,
theoretical synthesis: "For twenty years, American legal thought
has been dominated by two movements inspired by an ideal of
legal science that is antagonistic to common-law tradition and to
the claims of practical wisdom which that tradition has always
honored."' 5 And the claims of practical wisdom that are essential
to maintain the lawyer-statesman ideal are in danger of being
repudiated in the law school classroom:
It is in the law school classroom that lawyers are introduced to
the culture of the profession and here that their professional
self-conception first takes shape. If the claims of practical
wisdom are repudiated here - which the penetration into the
classroom of a neo-Langdellian ideal of scholarship makes
increasingly likely - it will be harder to retrieve them later and
hence more difficult to understand, let alone embrace, any ideal
of professional excellence in which the virtue of prudence
occupies a central place. 6
Professor Glendon begins her critical analysis of changes in
legal education by discussing changes in the composition of law
school student bodies and faculties during the past three decades.

15. Id. at 267.
16. Id. at 269.
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Professor Glendon argues that in the late 1960s through the early
1990s law school matriculation became a "default" activity for
many college graduates who drifted to law school because they
could be admitted, and because attending law school was a socially
respectable way of treading water while deciding on a career
choice. Professor Glendon suggests that the presence in law
schools of so many bright students who were never committed to
law as a profession had an important impact on the nature of law
school culture. 7 This suggestion, in my judgment, captures the
reality that the attitudes, aspirations, and ambitions of law students
have a significant impact on the behavior and attitudes of law
school faculties and thus on the intellectual climate of the law
schools.
Professor Glendon also notes that during the past thirty years
an increasing number of people entered the law teaching profession
who had earned both law degrees and advanced degrees in other
disciplines. 8 Whether or not some of these people were drawn to
a career in law teaching because they had made a practical
assessment of the job markets in other fields, their appearance in
the law teaching market coincided neatly with an effort by law
schools to demonstrate the legitimacy of their attachment to
research universities by emphasizing their connection to the world
of inquiry and critical thinking in disciplines other than law.
Like Dean Kronman, Professor Glendon also notes changes in
the nature of academic scholarship. In particular, she points to an
increase in what she describes as "advocacy scholarship" which she
sees as being antithetical to the objective and dispassionate quest
for understanding that is a hallmark of the craft of the common-law
tradition and of sound academic inquiry. 9
In addition to changes in the legal academy that threaten to
erode the ideals of the profession, both Dean Kronman and
Professor Glendon describe changes in the practice of law during
the past quarter century. Both authors focus on the well-documented changes in the nature of the law practice in large law firms.
During the past twenty years, large law firms have dramatically
increased in size, and many firms have opened branch offices and
become multi-city and, in some cases, multi-national firms.

17. See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 208-03.
18. Id. at 203-04.
19. Id. at 208.
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Moreover, clients have demonstrated diminishing loyalty to
particular law firms. Thus, there is less opportunity for lawyers and
firms to become familiar with the businesses, cultures, and
personnel of their clients. Dean Kronman notes that lawyers in
large law firms today work longer hours than did their counterparts
two or three decades ago. But perhaps the most important change
in practice, in Dean Kronman's view, is the change in the nature of
the work performed by large firm lawyers. Their work has become
more specialized in at least two respects: First, there has been an
increase in the demand for technical specialization in increasingly
narrow fields of law. Second, outside counsel are increasingly
being called upon to perform legal services for corporations in
connection with "extraordinary matters" rather than for more
routine legal work.2"
With this background Dean Kronman asks whether the large
corporate law firm offers a professional environment that supports
the lawyer-statesman ideal. Not surprisingly, he answers this
question in the negative. The most interesting argument in support
of his conclusion is that the more fleeting and limited relationships
between corporate clients and their outside counsel do not provide
sufficient depth and context to enable lawyers to fulfill an important aspect of the lawyer-statesman ideal: the ability to provide
clients with independent advice as to ends rather than means and,
indeed, in some instances, to offer preemptive advice. As Dean
Kronman points out, "[W]ithout a context of the sort that long,
routine acquaintance provides, it becomes more difficult to advise
a client in any but instrumental terms and in particular [more
difficult] to answer the questions of ultimate ends that extraordinary situations often pose for the client's human representatives ... .,21 This argument follows from Dean Kronman's
proposition that:
The most demanding and also most rewarding function that
lawyers perform is to help their clients decide what it is they
really want, to help them make up their minds as to what their

ends should be, a function that differs importantly from the
instrumental servicing of preestablished goals.

20.

KRONMAN,

21.

Id. at 286.

supra note 1, at 283-91.

It is this
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enterprise of codeliberation that the lawyer-statesman ideal
places at the center of the lawyer's professional life.'
Professor Glendon describes changes in large law firm practice
that have had the effect of greatly altering the understandings and
expectations of large law firm lawyers. There was a time when
lawyers joined large law firms with the expectation that good, hard
work would yield a reasonable or at least a fair chance for partnership. And partnership itself was considered as the equivalent of
academic tenure. Neither associates nor partners were universally
expected to generate business, but all were expected to perform
high quality legal work. Those few who failed to do so were
treated somewhat gently as they were advised (and helped) to seek
other opportunities.
By the late 1980s, however, economic
pressures caused large-scale layoffs of big firm associates. Partners'
incomes were reduced; partners were fired. Increases in firm size,law firm mergers, the emergence of the lateral-entry lawyer, and
the necessity for attending to the business of the practice changed
both the nature of collegiality and methods of training of young
lawyers in large firms.
Professor Glendon sees the impact of some of these changes
in terms very similar to those expressed by Dean Kronman: "The
ideal of the well-rounded generalist, the lawyer sought after for
judgment as well as technical skill, became increasingly elusive."23
Moreover, the notion of the independent professional engaged in
a craft and exercising judgment was eroded by the fact that clients
became more powerful and thus more autonomous in relation to
their lawyers: "Lawyers' ideals of independence, always shaky, also
have come under special stress in recent years. Those ideals once
meant turning away business under certain circumstances and
24
telling existing clients things they did not want to hear.
Moreover, "companies now want. . . from outside lawyers.. . what
low-status clients have always desired in highly charged, one-shot
25
situations: zealous representation, rather than co-deliberation.,
While these incomplete synopses of the Glendon and Kronman
books cannot do justice to the books themselves, I hope it is
apparent that these books provide a considerable number of points

22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 288.
GLENDON, supra note 2, at 29.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
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of departure for potentially useful conversations about the state of
our profession. One set of topics for conversation are subjects
addressed either glancingly or not at all by Kronman and Glendon.
For example, neither Dean Kronman nor Professor Glendon
describe, as part of the "crisis" of the profession, the mismatch in
this country between demand for legal services by individuals,
26
families, and small businesses and the supply of those services.
Moreover, neither Kronman nor Glendon deals directly with the
impact of technology on the practice of law or with issues raised by
the increasing globalization of the economy. Finally, as must be
obvious, the point of view of Dean Kronman and Professor
Glendon is the point of view of law teachers at elite law schools
describing the world of law practice largely from the perspective of
the large law firms into which many, if not most, of the law
graduates of Yale and Harvard ultimately disappear. There is,
however, a great professional world out there beyond the big firms
and elite schools in which most lawyers are educated and practice,
in which most clients receive services, and in which most judges
receive briefs and pleadings. It is by no means clear, even if one
accepts the idea that the large law firms are leaders of the
profession, that the state of things in the great majority of professional settings is anywhere near as grim as Dean Kronman and
Professor Glendon describe. My sense is that the tradition of the
lawyer-statesman that Dean Kronman so reveres is in fact alive and
well in many parts of the country and in a variety of practice
settings. It is far from clear that the problems identified with the
large firms or the elite law schools are necessarily the problems
afflicting the profession as a whole. This, it seems to me, is a topic
for a very interesting series of conversations.
Despite the limitations of their books, Dean Kronman and
Professor Glendon provide useful and stimulating views of the
profession at the end of the century. The essays in this symposium
are important contributions to our conversations about the current
state of the profession. Professors Jack Sammons and Mark
Galanter engage most directly in the dialogue of Dean Kronman
and Professor Glendon. Dean Kronman himself has contributed an
essay to this collection in which he expands upon some of the
themes of his book and, perhaps, as Professor Laurel Terry points

26. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND
CIVIL JUSTICE (1996).
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out here, offers a version of his own ideas that might not entirely
have been predicted by a reading of The Lost Lawyer. Lawrence
Fox, Chair of the American Bar Association Litigation Section, a
big firm litigator, and one of our nation's leading thinkers about
professional ethics, and Ward Bower, one of the world's leading
law practice management consultants, address the challenges faced
by large law firms in an increasingly complex world in which the
economics of law practice are somewhat problematic, especially
when related to our ethical aspirations. Professor Robert Lawry
inquires about a specific and very tough issue of legal ethics in the
context of the lawyer-statesman paradigm suggested by Dean
Kronman. Robert MacCrate, former President of the American
Bar Association and one of our profession's most thoughtful
leaders, considers here the question of shared responsibility for
lawyer education in skills and values. Judge Joseph Belacossa,
former Chair of the American Bar Association Section of Legal
Education and Admission to the Bar, writes about quality in legal
education and practice. Professors Laurel Terry and Marilyn
Yarbrough address more directly some questions related to the role
of law schools in preserving and promoting the ideals of good law
practice. Professor Terry suggests that perhaps we should reconsider the informal and formal ways in which we categorize law schools
so that we provide positive recognition to schools that emphasize
professional education rather than theoretical research. Professor
Yarbrough addresses in a very particular case the question that
underlies some of the concerns expressed by Dean Kronman and
Professor Glendon about the extent to which law teachers provide
models for and explicit explanations of appropriate, thoughtful, and
sensitive professional behavior.
The purpose of this symposium is to stimulate conversation
between academic lawyers, practicing lawyers, and judges regarding
the state of the legal profession. These conversations must be
undertaken if we are to understand the nature and dimensions of
the challenges we face and develop appropriate responses to these
challenges. It is my hope that this symposium will facilitate further
discussions about the future of the legal profession and that this
Review will continue to serve as a vehicle for thoughtful dialogue
about the law and our profession.

